Questions of information flow are in many ways more important than questions of access control, because the goal of many security policies is to thwart the unauthorized release of information, not merely the illicit obtaining of access rights to that information. The Take-Grant Protection Model is an excellent theoretical tool for examining such issues because conditions necessary and sufficient for information to flow between two objects, and for rights to objects to be obtained or stolen, are known. In this paper we extend these results by examining the question of information flow from an object the owner of which is unwilling to release that information. Necessary and sufficient conditions for such "theft of information" to occur are derived. To emphasize the usefulness of these results, the security policies of complete isolation, transfer of rights with the cooperation of an owner, and transfer of information (but not rights) with the cooperation of the owner are presented; the last is used to model a subject guarding a resource.
Introduction
The terms security and safety are often used interchangeably; in fact, they are not synonyms. The term "safe" applies to a system in which it is not possible to reach a new state in which something undesirable occurs. In terms of security models, this means that a right, or information, can be transferred without authority, and the term "secure" is applied to those systems which are "safe," i . e . that do not allow the transfer of rights or information illicitly. When applied to a concrete system, security requires not only that the abstract model of the system be secure, but also that the concrete system correctly implement the abstract model. Because of the complexity of demonstrating correctness of implementation, analyses of the security of the abstract models are far more common than proofs of security.
Portions of this work were supported by grant NAG2-480 from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to Dartmouth College, were done at Dartmouth College, and stem from the author's Ph.D. dissertation. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the First Computer Security Foundations Workshop in Franconia, NH (1988) .
General questions of safety aside, questions of access control often require specific answers in specific settings; for example, given some explicit set of operations, can one user access a file belonging to another user? This question has been discussed for many types of systems, for many sets of rules, and in contexts other than formal modelling (for example, see [9] [19] [22] ). The advantage of not using formal models is that the discussion focuses on what access control policies are realistic, both in implementation and in enforcement; the disadvantage is that the effects of the rules implementing those policies depend on a host of factors that are often overlooked or not understood thoroughly.
The Take-Grant Protection Model presents features of both types of models, namely those used to analyze questions of safety and those used to analyze the effects of specific access control policies. It represents systems as graphs to be altered by specific operations and, although the model was developed to test the limits of the results in [13] , in this model, safety is not merely decidable even if the number of objects which can be created is unbounded, but it is decidable in time linear in the size of the graph. Further, the focus of most studies of this model have been on characterizing conditions necessary and sufficient for the transfer of rights, on the number of active entities that must cooperate for such transfers to take place, and on the complexity of testing for those conditions in a representation of a system. For this reason it is in some sense of more "practical" use than other formal systems, in that the safety question is decidable and the study of the complexity of conditions allowing compromise is emphasized.
Early work on the Take-Grant Protection Model [15] [18] dealt with the transfer of rights assuming all active agents in the system would cooperate. Snyder extended these characterizations to include conditions under which rights could be stolen [28] ; Bishop and Snyder introduced the notion of information flow and formulated necessary and sufficient conditions for information sharing [5] .
Distinct from other access control models, the Take Grant Protection Model formalizes the notions of conspiracy in the context of transfer of rights [28] and information flow (this work). One contribution of this paper is to combine the notion of "theft" with the notion of "information flow," thereby providing an information flow analogue to the can • snoop predicate; the other is to extend the idea of conspiracy to the theft of information. This line of analysis has not been attempted with Appeared in Journal of Computer Security 3 (4) pp. 283-309 (1994/1995).
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Applications of the model to various systems have been explored [4] [14] [26] [30] . This paper also characterizes some very simple systems using the new results, but does not attempt to analyze them at length because the focus of this paper is on information and the conspiracies needed to obtain it. Using the new results to analyze current models of disclosure and integrity (for example, those described in [1] [7] [8] [20] [21] [29] ) is itself a separate paper; it is beyond the scope of the issues addressed here.
In the next two sections, we review the rules governing transfer of rights and information within the model, as well as some of the consequences of those rules. Next, we define, and present necessary and sufficient conditions for, the theft of information; following that, we present bounds on the number of actors needed for information to be shared (or stolen). We then briefly compare our results to similar ones for theft of rights. To demonstrate the usefulness of the concepts, we express the security policies of total isolation, owners being allowed to transfer rights, owners being allowed to transfer information but not rights, and then analyze the concept of a reference monitor.
Finally, we suggest areas for future research.
Transfers of Authority
Let a finite, directed graph called a protection graph represent a system to be modelled. A protection graph has two distinct kinds of vertices, called subjects and objects . Subjects are active vertices, and (for example) can represent users; they can pass authority by invoking graph rewriting rules . Objects, on the other hand, are completely passive; they can (for example) represent files, and do nothing.
In protection graphs, the subjects are represented by • and objects by ❍ . Vertices which may be either subjects or objects are represented by ⊗ . Pictures are very often used to show the effects of applying a graph rewriting rule on the graph; the symbol |-is used to mean that the graph following it is produced by the action of a graph rewriting rule on the graph preceding it. The symbol |-* represents several successive rule applications. The term witness means a sequence of graph rewriting rules which produce the predicate or condition being witnessed, and a witness is often demonstrated by listing the graph rewriting rules that make up the witness (usually with pictures).
The edges of a protection graph are labelled with subsets of a finite set R of rights. Suppose that R = { r , w , t , g }, where r , w , t , and g represent r ead, w rite, t ake, and g rant rights, respectively. Appeared in Journal of Computer Security 3 (4) pp. 283-309 (1994/1995).
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When written as labels on a graph, or when the set of rights under discussion contains only one element, the set braces are normally omitted.
The Take-Grant Protection Model permits vertices with certain rights to transfer rights from one vertex to another. The rules governing the transfer of rights are called de jure rules and are as follows:
take : Let x , y , and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let x be a subject. Let there be an edge from x to y labelled γ with , an edge from y to z labelled β , and .
Then the take rule defines a new graph G 1 by adding an edge to the protection graph from
The rule is written " x takes ( α to z ) from y ." grant : Let x , y , and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let x be a subject. Let there be an edge from x to y labelled γ with , an edge from x to z labelled β, and . Then the grant rule defines a new graph G 1 by adding an edge to the protection graph from y to z labelled α. Graphically, The rule is written "x grants (α to z) to y." create: Let x be any subject in a protection graph G 0 and let . Create defines a new graph G 1 by adding a new vertex y to the graph and an edge from x to y labelled α. Graphically,
The rule is written "x creates (α to new vertex) y."
remove: Let x and y be any distinct vertices in a protection graph G 1 such that x is a subject. Let there be an explicit edge from x to y labelled β, and let . Then remove defines a new The rule is written "x removes (α to) y."
The edges which appear in the above graph are called explicit because they represent authority known to the protection system. Further, and more formally, a vertex is an actor relative to the application of a graph rewriting rule if that rule requires that vertex to be a subject.
Note that there is a duality between the take and grant rules when the edge labelled t or g is between two subjects. Specifically, with the cooperation of both subjects, rights can be transmitted backwards along the edges. The following two lemmata [15] demonstrate this:
Lemma 2.
As a result, when considering the transfer of authority between cooperating subjects, neither direction nor label of the edge is important, so long as the label is in the set { t, g }.
Under what conditions can rights be shared? To answer this question, we first need some definitions; for more exposition, the reader is referred to [15] .
Definition.
A tg-path is a nonempty sequence v 0 , …, v n of distinct vertices such that for all i, , v i is connected to v i+1 by an edge (in either direction) with a label containing t or g.
Vertices are tg-connected if there is a tg-path between them.
Definition. An island is a maximal tg-connected subject-only subgraph.
With each tg-path, associate one or more words over the alphabet in the obvious way. If the
← } path has length 0, then the associated word is the null word ν. The notation t* and v n with associated word in { t → * }.
A bridge is a tg-path with endpoints v 0 and v n both subjects and the path's associated (3.2) there exists a subject vertex x´ such that x´ = x or x´ initially spans to x; (3.3) there exists a subject vertex s´ such that s´ = s or s´ terminally spans to s; and (3.4) there exist islands I 1 , …, I n such that x´ is in I 1 , s´ is in I n , and there is a bridge from I j to I j+1 (1 ≤ j < n). Finally, if the right can be transferred without any vertex which has that right applying a rule, the right is said to be stolen. Formally:
Definition. The predicate can•steal(α, x, y, G 0 ) is true if and only if there is no edge labelled α from x to y in G 0 , there exist protection graphs G 1 , …, G n such that G 0 |-*G n using only de jure rules, in G n there is an edge from x to y labelled α, and if there is an edge labelled α from s to q in G 0 , then no rule in a witness has the form "s grants (α to q) to z" for any z ∈ G j (1 ≤ j < n). These rules apply only to the transfer of rights. But information may be transferred without any transfer of rights. Let us now examine this question.
Transfers of Information
The de jure rules control the transfer of authority only; they say nothing about the transfer of information. Instead, we use a different set of rules, called de facto rules, to derive paths along which information may flow.
In order to describe transfers of information, we cannot use explicit edges because no change in authority occurs. Still, some indication of the paths along which information can be passed is necessary. Hence, we use a dashed line, labelled by r, to represent the path of a potential de facto transfer. Such an edge is called an implicit edge. Notice that implicit edges cannot be manipulated by de jure rules, since the de jure rules only affect authorities recorded in the protection system, and implicit edges do not represent such authority.
The following set of de facto rules was introduced in [5] to model transfers of information:
post: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let x and z be subjects.
Let there be an edge from x to y labelled α with and an edge from z to y labelled β, r α ∈ where . Then the post rule defines a new graph G 1 with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. Graphically,
The rule is written "z posts to x through y," and is so named because it is reminiscent of y being a mailbox to which z posts a letter that x reads.
pass: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let y be a subject. Let there be an edge from y to x labelled α with and an edge from y to z labelled β, where . Then the pass rule defines a new graph G 1 with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. Graphically,
The rule is written "y passes from z to x," and is so named because y acquires the information from z and passes it on to x,for example by copying a file.
spy: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let x and y be subjects.
Let there be an edge from x to y labelled α with and an edge from y to z labelled β, where . Then the spy rule defines a new graph G 1 with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. Graphically,
The rule is written "x spies on z using y," and is so named because x is "looking over the shoulder" of y to monitor z. For example, x reads y's protected file z by reading the unprotected memory of a process with which y is displaying the contents of z.
find: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G 0 , and let y and z be subjects.
Let there be an edge from y to x labelled α with and an edge from z to y labelled β,
where . Then the findrule defines a new graph G 1 with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. Graphically,
The rule is written "x finds from z through y," and is named because x is completely passive;
z and y give it information, which x then "finds," such as information sent by a user z to the mail server y, which then inserts it into x's mailbox.
Note that these rules add implicit and not explicit edges. Further, as these rules model information flow, they can be used when either (or both) of the edges between x and y, or y and z, are implicit.
When can information flow from one vertex to another?
Definition. The predicate can•know(x, y, G 0 ) is true if and only if there exists a sequence of protection graphs G 0 , …, G n such that G 0 |-*G n , and in G n there is an edge from x to y labelled r or an edge from y to x labelled w, and if the edge is explicit, its source is a subject.
Definition. An rwtg-path is a nonempty sequence v 0 , …, v n of distinct vertices such that for all i, , v i is connected to v i+1 by an edge (in either direction) with a label containing t, g, r or w.
With each rwtg-path, associate one or more words over the alphabet { t 
Definition.
A bridge is an rwtg-path with v 0 and v n both subjects and the path's associated word in
Note this is the same as the definition given earlier.
A connection is an rwtg-path with v 0 and v n both subjects and the path's associated
The next result [5] characterizes the set of graphs for which can•know is true: Proof: Immediate from the proof of Theorem 5 (see [5] ). Note that other vertices may be created and then act, but these are not present in G 0 .
In order to appreciate these results, let us now look at some examples of the uses of the rules and theorems; these will be useful in deriving our later results.
Some Examples of Combined de jure and de facto Rule Applications
In this section we present new results which are not only good examples of how the graph rewriting rules and the theorems in the previous sections are used, but also which will be quite useful in our later work. The first two results are quite basic, and state that if one subject has take or grant rights over another subject, either can (with the cooperation of the other) read information from the other. More formally:
Proof: First, y creates (rw to new vertex) z:
Next, x takes (rw to z) from y:
Finally, x and y use the post rule through z:
Note that the direction of the implicit read edge depends on which rights x and y use. If x writes to z and y reads from z, the implicit edge (information flow) goes from x to y. If, on the other hand, y writes to z and x reads from z, the implicit edge goes from y to x.
■
The next lemma shows that both x and y must act, or no information can be transferred:
Lemma 9. Let a vertex x have take rights over another vertex y, and assume the graph contains no subjects except (possibly) for x and y. If either x or y does not act, no sequence of graph transformations can add an implicit or explicit edge from x to y.
Proof: Assume first that x does not act. All de jure rules which add an outgoing edge require the source of that edge to be an actor (take, create) or have an incoming grant edge (grant). All the de facto rules which add an outgoing implicit edge require the source of that edge to be a subject (post)
or have an incoming read (spy) or write (pass, post) edge. As the vertex x meets none of these requirements, it can never be given an implicit or explicit read edge to y. Now assume y does not act. As there is no edge labelled r with y as its target, examination
of the de jure rules shows no edge labelled r with y as its target can be added. Examination of the de facto rules shows that, in order to add an implicit edge labelled r into y, there must either be an incoming (explicit or implicit) edge labelled r (pass and spy rules), or y must be an actor (postand find rules). As neither of these conditions is met, no sequence of graph transformations can add an implicit or explicit edge from x to y.
Proof: An exercise for the reader.
As in Lemma 9, both x and y must act, or no information can be transferred:
Lemma 11. Let a vertex x have take rights over another vertex y, and assume the graph contains no subjects except (possibly) for x and y. If either x or y does not act, no sequence of graph transformations can add an implicit or explicit edge from x to y.
The next case shows that information can flow backwards along a write edge:
Not surprisingly, both x and y must act, or no information can be transferred:
Lemma 13. Let a vertex x have write rights over another vertex y. If either x or y does not act, no sequence of graph transformations can add an implicit or explicit edge from x to y.
Later we shall consider the circumstances under which information can flow from a subject vertex y to another subject vertex x. To provide a basis for the results, let us consider the case of a protection graph G 0 with at least three vertices, namely x and y, and another vertex z which may be either a subject or an object. There is a path from x to z and a path from y to z; these are the only paths in the graph. (Note that these paths may include vertices other than their endpoints. However, we are assuming that except for such internal vertices, there are no vertices other than x, y, and z.)
Furthermore, these paths may be initial, terminal, rw-initial, or rw-terminal (any combination is possible). Our problem is to derive witnesses to can•know(x, y, G 0 ) for those combinations of paths for which that predicate is true, and to prove that predicate is false for the others.
•
Without loss of generality, we can assume that initial, terminal, rw-initial, and rw-terminal spans are all of length 1, because if the path is longer, all edges but the first are take edges and so by repeated applications of the take rule the vertex at the source of the directed path may obtain an edge with the rights of the last edge in the path.
First, if the path from y to z is rw-terminal and z is a subject, then the word associated with the x to y path is not in the set and so can•know(x, y, G 0 ) is false by condition (5.3) of Theorem 5; similarly, if z is an object, the word associated with the x to y path will not be in the set and, again, can•know(x, y, G 0 ) is false. If the path from x to z is rw-initial, similar reasoning shows again that can•know(x, y, G 0 ) is false whether or not z is a subject.
The other 15 combinations are presented in Table 1 (these can be determined by Theorem 5 and Lemma 11). For later reference, we state: Proof: Immediate from the definition of bridge, Lemma 8, Lemma 10, and the entries at the intersection of the "terminal" and "initial" rows and columns in Table 1 .
Lemma 15. Let a subject x be connected by a bridge to another subject y in a graph containing exactly two subjects. If either x or y does not act, no sequence of graph transformations can add an implicit or explicit edge from x to y.
Proof:
Immediate from the definition of bridge, Lemma 9, and Lemma 11. is true.
Proof: Immediate from the definition of connection and the entries in Table 1 .
■
Now, let us consider the nature of the can•know predicate further: 
there is an (implicit or explicit) path labelled r from w i to w i+1 (by the definition of can•know).
Hence u i+1 = w i , u 1 = x or x′, and u i+2 = y or y′ in Theorem 5, establishing the result. proprietary information that its competitors need desperately to see. Alice, who works with this information quite a bit, has the authority to read the documents containing the proprietary informa-tion whenever she likes, with the understanding she is not to pass this sensitive data to anyone else, including co-workers and superiors. The situation, in Take-Grant terms, is:
Any documents as sensitive as those which Alice consults must be kept under lock and key.
Alice's company has several large vaults, and Alice has a key to one. To prevent employees with the keys from making copies, when an employee leaves the office, her key must be placed in her desk and the desk locked. To handle emergencies (such as Alice misplacing the key which unlocks her desk), a set of master desk keys is kept in the office of the chief of building security. The only person with a key to that office is the chief of building security, Bobby. Now, Bobby is not cleared to read any of Alice's documents, but he can "take" Alice's right to do so by opening her desk with his master key and copying her vault key. He can then pass the information on to someone else.
This is an example of Alice's sharing (albeit unknowingly) her right to read the documents (To make the analogy precise, the key to the vault is the "read right" and the key to the desk is the "take right," because with the latter key one can "take," or copy, the former key.)
Alice takes a sensitive document out of the vault, goes back to her desk, and begins to read Alice's shoulder; if Alice read the document elsewhere, such as in the vault, Cathy would no longer be able to read the document over Alice's shoulder (so, in Take-Grant terms, the spy rule would not be applicable as there is no implicit or explicit Cathy-to-Alice read edge). Notice the difference between this case and the previous one: here, Alice must "cooperate" in some sense of the word by reading the data where Cathy could see it (such as at Alice's desk); were Alice to read it elsewhere, for example in the vault, Cathy could not see it. But so long as data is stored in the vault (a company requirement), Alice need not cooperate in any way with the building security chief in order for him to obtain the data, because by using his master key for the desks, not only does he have a copy of Alice's right to read, but also he can exercise that right whenever he wishes, regardless of Alice's presence. And the key to his office controls access to his copies of those other keys.
The can•know predicate fails to capture the distinction between these two situations. To r, x, y, G 0 ) is false, note that any read edge from x to y in G n must be implicit. And for the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that y will not cooperate (either wittingly or unwittingly) with any snooping; it would be equally reasonable to assume that y would cooperate, in which case what follows must be modified somewhat. (We shall return to this point later.) Table 2 shows the relationship between information, cooperation, and the four predicates.
We leave it as an exercise to the reader to show that can•snoop(x, y, G 0 ) , can•steal(r, x, y, G Note that by Corollary 7 we may without loss of generality take all vertices other than the u i 's to be objects.
As can•snoop(x, y, G 0 ) is true, the witness establishing that predicate is also a witness establishing can•know(x, y, G 0 ). Further, by part (c) of the definition, in this witness neither y nor any subject directly connected to y is an actor in a grant rule or a de facto rule resulting in a read edge with y as its target. Two cases now arise.
First, suppose y is an object, and look at the subject u n in the witness W, above. This is the subject that rw-terminally spans to y in condition (5.2). Consider the nature of this rw-terminal span. If it is simply a read edge from u n to y, by inspection of the de facto rules it will need to act to pass along information, thereby violating part (c) of the definition of can•snoop. Hence the rwterminal span must involve one or more take edges followed by a read edge incident upon y; in this case, choose w n in (19.3) to be u n . Now, suppose y is a subject. Without loss of generality, we may take u n = y in (5.2); by the- of can•snoop, the owner of r rights to y will not pass information from y to anyone else. Again by part (c), y will not write information from itself to anyone else, so ρ i cannot be a post or find rule.
As neither the create nor the remove rule adds edges to existing vertices, ρ i cannot be either. Hence, ρ i must be a take rule.
Let z and z' be the two other vertices involved in this take rule. We therefore have ρ i : z takes (r to y) from z´, where z´ is a vertex in G i-1 . By Theorem 5 we see that can•know(w 1 , y, G 0 ) is true.
Apply Theorem 5 again. By this theorem, there is a subject u n such that u n = y or u n rw-terminally spans to y. As there is no direct edge labelled r from u n to y in G 0 , then z must be the u n in Theorem The proof technique used above is very similar to the one used to prove theorem 6, the main difference being the consideration of de facto rule applications. This emphasizes the similarity of the two predicates.
As an example, let us return to the office described at the beginning of this section. Consider Here, Alice is authorized to read the data, and her supervisor, Katie, is authorized to acquire any right Alice has. Katie's friend Donna is another manager on the same project, so has the right to read whatever Katie may pass to her. But Donna cannot acquire rights over Katie's subordinates.
As condition (4.4) fails, can•steal({r}, Donna, data, G 3 ) is false; but if we take x = w 1 = Donna, w n = Katie, and y = data in Theorem 19, we see can•snoop(Donna, data, G 3 ) is true.
Applications of the Theory
Before we discuss security breaches, we should say a few words about the notion of a security policy. Breaches of security are defined in terms of a set of rules governing the use (and abuse) of a computer system. These rules, called the security policy, define what is allowed and what is not allowed. For example, a security policy may require that rights to a file be given only by the owner; in this case, if the owner mailed a copy of a protected file to another user, no breach of security has occurred even if the recipient had no right to see the file. The test of a system's security is how well it implements the policy.
In this section we consider three different security policies. The first is that of complete isolation of subjects; this technique is quite effective for solving the problem of transferring information and rights, but in most cases is far too restrictive. The second is that the owner of an object controls the dissemination of rights over that object; this is the policy exhibited by some database systems such as System R. The third is that no subject other than the owner may have any rights to We consider first the statement of each policy in terms of the four predicates, then describe the set of graphs that satisfy that policy; finally, we construct protocols which preserve membership of the graphs in the set when the protocols are used.
Complete Isolation of Each Process
The policy of total isolation of each process prevents breaches of security and solves the confinement problem by preventing any transfer of information or rights among subjects [17] .
To prevent any information or rights transfer (illicit or otherwise) it suffices to make all four predicates always be false.The set of graphs satisfying this policy contains exactly those graphs h
for all pairs of vertices x and y in h, and all subsets of rights α ⊆ R.
To characterize this requirement in terms of the rules, note that by Theorem 3 and Theorem 5, it suffices to prevent any bridges or connections between any two subjects to enforce this condition; in that case, both conditions (3.4) and (5.3) can never hold. Because the x and y referred to in the theorems may be subjects, it is not possible to prevent conditions (3.2), (3.3), (5.1), and (5.2) a priori from occurring; hence the above constraint is also necessary. This may be formalized to prove the following Take-Grant characterization of the set of graphs satisfying the policy: Theorem 20. To enforce complete isolation of subjects, no bridges or connections may exist between any two subjects in the protection graph.
Determining whether or not a protection graph meets this requirement is easy: just look for bridges or connections between subjects. Also, when a new de jure rule is applied, we can test for violation of the restriction just by looking at the paths affected by the rule application; in the worst case, this requires checking every edge in the graph. So: This does not require any changes to the take or grant rules, since in a graph in which creation is disallowed, bridges and connections may not be constructed unless they already exist.
However, it does require changing the create rule, since if one subject creates another (for example, when a new user is added to the system), the parent may give itself any rights in R to the child.
Should one of these rights be take, grant, read, or write, there will be a bridge, connection, or both between the parent and the child. We do so in the manner of Snyder [26] by requiring all subjects to create other subjects using the following subject creation protocol: subject creation protocol:
A subject x desiring to create a subject y over which x has the set of rights α, x must execute the following rules atomically:
x creates (α to new subject y)
x removes ({ t, g, r, w } to) y By enforcing this protocol, and preventing any node from applying the create rule directly to create a subject, complete isolation can be enforced.
We should note though that in practise such systems would be useless, since no process could communicate with another in any fashion. Even in systems where isolation is desired, it is typically used to prevent specific sets of processes from communicating; other processes may communicate freely. (For example, a system enforcing security levels would allow two processes at the same level to communicate freely, whereas one at a higher level could not transmit information to a process at a lower level.) So, most likely the "complete isolation" would be enforced between (for example) children of different subjects, and a different statement of the security policy would be needed. Hence, we turn from this somewhat uninteresting policy to consider one in which the holder of a right over an object determines to what other subjects it shall pass that right.
Transfer on Possession of a Right
This policy creates a system in which mere possession of a right enables a subject to propagate that right. Hence the set of graphs meeting this policy is the set of graphs with elements sat-
for all protection graphs h, all pairs of vertices x and y in h, and all subsets of rights α ⊆ R. The reasoning is that any two subjects must be able to share rights or information, but no set of subjects can steal rights or information without the consent of the owner. To satisfy the first two predicates, the owner must cooperate in any transfer of rights; to satisfy the latter two, the owner must cooperate in any sharing of information. We also note that any pair of subjects can share rights or information by the construction of this condition. Theorem 22. If no subject has any incident take edges, then the security policy allowing the possessor of a right to transfer that right to another is implemented.
Testing for this condition is simple: The obvious way to prevent creation of take edges is to make the appropriate modification to the subject creation protocol above. However, the lack of take edges also inhibits sharing; to see why, notice that the grant rule does not add any edges to the source of the edge labelled grant.
Hence, Lemma 2 cannot hold (in fact, the proof that it is true requires the use of a take rule). Now consider a graph h meeting this security policy. As there are no take edges, the only take edges that could be added using the rules would be to new vertices. If those vertices are subjects, any subsequent manipulation of those rights would require an application of Lemma 2, which is false given the replacement of the create rule for subjects by the modified subject creation protocol.
To overcome this problem, we can require that in the initial graph, all subjects have grant rights to one another, and modify the subject creation protocol to be:
granting subject creation protocol: A subject x desiring to create a subject y over which x has the set of rights α, x must execute the following rules atomically:
x removes ({ t } to) y x grants ({ g } to all other subjects) to y x grants ({ g } to y) to all other subjects If this protocol is used to create subjects, creating a new subject would add an incoming grant edge to the parent, in which case the proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward (see figure 2 ). Then as Lemma 2 is true, the transfer of any rights from a newly created subject to the parent using take can be emulated by the child granting the parent the rights. If the child is an object, of course, the issue never arises since the only way a right can be added to the child is by the parent granting the right, in which case application of the take rule is redundant and can be eliminated. Hence the security policy will hold.
Owner Propagates Information but Not Rights
This policy creates a system in which only one subject is to have rights over a designated object. Those rights may not be transferred (with or without the consent of the subject). However, the subject may allow information to flow out of the object. An example of this policy would be a network server which responds to queries by giving information about the users active on a computer; the server has the right to obtain that information from the system and pass that data to an-
g y creates (g to new subject) s using the granting subject creation protocol s g |- for all protection graphs h, any element r of the set of distinguished objects (called "resources"),
any vertex x h, and all subsets of rights α ⊆ R. The reasoning is that no rights to the resource may be transferred (hence the first two predicates must be false). To satisfy the latter two predicates, the owner must cooperate in any sharing of information.
If can•share(α,x,r,h) is false, so is can•steal(α,x,r,h), and without loss of generality we can consider only the former. Given that s in Theorem 3 is the unique subject (or monitor) m which possesses rights to r, (3.1) and (3.3) both hold; as x may be a subject, (3.2) holds. Hence (3.4) must be made to fail; the obvious way is to prevent there being bridges between m and any other subject.
This means that no take or grant rights may be incident on m (unless they are between m and r).
The ability to transfer information is required; however, such transfers require m be an ac- Finally, we note that the same problems for complete isolation arise if m can create subjects; but if the following creation protocol is always used by m, the security policy will be en- This preserves the condition that no take or grant edges be incident upon m.
Reference Monitors
The concept of a reference monitor was first described in [2] as a subject or process meeting three requirements:
1. the process must be isolated (that is, tamper-proof);
2. the process must be complete (that is, always invoked when the resource it controls is accessed); and 3. the process must be verifiable (that is, small enough to be subject to analyses and tests the completeness of which can be ensured).
We now restate these three conditions in terms of the Take-Grant Protection Model. Let the reference monitor be m and the resource it protects be r. Isolation means that no-one can write over the monitor; this may be stated as ¬can•share({w},x,m,G 0 ) for all x ∈ G 0 . Completeness means that whenever any x ∈ G 0 obtains access to the resource, then m is an actor in the witness to the access. Verifiability is a bit more tricky, since it consists of two parts. The first, an implementationlevel task of verifying that the monitor is indeed implemented correctly, is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the second, which is a verification that no information will leak or rights be given away when the monitor is implemented correctly, is merely the condition in the preceding section.
Using that analysis, we may characterize what protection graphs containing reference monitors look like. Let G 0 be a protection graph with a single reference monitor m protecting a single resource r. Then no edge with a right in { w } may have m as its target and no edge with a right in { t, g } may be incident on m (with the possible exception of such an edge between m and r). As demonstrated in the previous section, the latter ensures information or rights may not be stolen from m, that m may not transfer rights, and that m must be an actor in any witness to a transfer of information. The former simply ensures no subject will ever be able to write to m, since no rule adds an edge labelled α unless there is already an edge labelled α already incident upon that vertex.
One general observation about modelling a reference monitor should be made. A reference monitor would be used to enforce rights indicated by the model; so the proof that the monitor is "secure" requires the assumption that the model is correctly implemented by the thing being mod-elled. However, this tautology holds for any method used to model a system; if there is a mechanism that enforces rights within the system based upon the model, the model cannot be used to examine that mechanism for security. Also, a reference monitor is simply a special case of a resource manager, the differences being that reference monitors do more than simply control access rights because they also control access, and they control access to all objects in a system; so given a mechanism to enforce those rights, the above applies to resource managers guarding resources other than the access control graph (such as printers, the CPU, and so forth).
Conclusion
This paper has explored several aspects of information transfer in the Take-Grant protection model. The notion of information theft was developed, and then necessary and sufficient conditions to steal information were determined. Finally, as an application of this theory, the theoretical characteristics of reference monitors were expressed in terms of those predicates.
This has several ramifications. The first is that the Take-Grant protection model, while primarily a theoretical tool, can be used to model very practical concepts. In [4] , the protection model was used to represent hierarchies and derive results paralleling the work done earlier by Bell and LaPadula [3] ; now, the model can be used to capture the key notions of reference monitors and of several security policies. In short, the model can no longer be held to be a purely theoretical tool.
Some aspects of the model are particularly enticing in terms of applicability to real systems.
For example, many models allow reflexive rights. The Take-Grant protection model does not. Correctly representing a real system in a theoretical model requires that all parts of the entity being modelled be represented as dictated by their attributes. Thus, a process would not be represented by a single subject; it would be a set of objects, some of which represent those parts of the process instructions and data resident in memory, others of which represent the resources held by the process, and so forth. The subject would represent the execution of the process. As the execution controls all the objects representing the process, it would have various rights over each. So if a process needed to access a part of its memory (say, to alter a variable which is shared with other processes), the subject would not need write permission on itself but rather write permission on the object representing that variable. Similarly, if certain portions of the process' memory were not writable (for example, the instructions making up the program being executed), the subject representing the process execution might have read rights, but not write rights, over that object. Hence the transfer of information does not appear to require reflexivity when a system is appropriately represented in a theoretical model. Similarly, as no subject should be able to confer upon itself rights which it does not already have, reflexivity adds nothing to the modelling of transfer of authority. This intuition indicates the model does not suffer from being irreflexive; indeed, it forces the modeler to break the system being modelled into all component parts. Perhaps this would reveal unrealized assumptions or dependencies.
As an aside, we note that formulating a reflexive version of the Take-Grant Protection Model would alter its nature radically. Even though this reflexive version would be biconditional (and hence in a class in which, in the general case, safety is undecidable [12] ), questions of safety would be decidable, as we pointed out in the introduction. In fact, if a subject had take rights over any other node, that subject would have all defined rights over that node. Further, if one subject had grant rights over another, that subject could give the target of the grant rights any authority over itself. While this would most likely not change the statement of the theorems giving necessary and sufficient conditions for sharing and theft, it would certainly change their interpretation (for example, the conditions in the theorems requiring the existence of a vertex s with an edge from s to another vertex y would be trivially true; just take s to be y). The precise effects of reflexivity, as well as its necessity, is an area in which further work is needed.
The rules for information transfer focus on reading, but by interchanging the read and write rights one could construct an equally logical set of de facto rules [5] . This would change the theorems involving the de facto rules considerably. The practical interpretation of those rules would also need to be addressed; in particular, given a real system, how does one know if the set of de facto rules completely captures all information flows in the system? The answer is not obvious and requires considerable research; suffice it to say that, for now, the rules used in this paper capture four of the most common techniques of transferring information without transferring rights.
In the definition of can•snoop, the target of the snooping was not to cooperate with the snooping. An alternate definition would be to allow the target to cooperate, but not the owners of the target; in this case, one could treat the target as a Trojan horse designed to "leak" information.
Under this assumption, the proof presented for Theorem 19 does not apply (specifically, the rule ρ i could be a post or find rule); this is not surprising, since condition (19.2) of that theorem is overly restrictive if q is a subject and allowed to act in a rule application. Another area for future work lies in the precise reformulation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for can•snoop to be true if the target of the snooping is allowed to act.
A related area is to incorporate a notion of "group" into the model. Changes of protection state in most computers do not affect a single process (subject) or resource (object); they affect several. However, within the Take-Grant protection model, each rule affects only one subject and one object (the source and target of the added implicit or explicit edge). How these rules might be modified to take these situations into account is another open area.
This leads to the following question: when the rules are changed to these "group rules," new theorems stating necessary and sufficient conditions for the predicates can•share, can•steal, can•know, and can•snoop to be true will have to be derived. It would be most useful if one could derive "metatheorems" instead, so that given a set of rules, one could use the metatheorems to state necessary and sufficient conditions for each of the predicates instead of having to rederive those results. This is yet another area for research.
